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OF THE STATE OF UTAH

*******
CONNIE RAY LUND,
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RALPH B. FOLEY,
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)

Defendant-Respondent.

*

)

*

*

****

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from the Order of Dismissal granted ·
by the Honorable John F. Wahlquist, Judge of the Second Judicial

District Court in and for Weber County, State of Utah, and
entered in the above entitled matter on the 22nd day of
January, 1980.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks a reversal of the Order of Dismissal
and a remand to the lower court for a full trial on the merits
or, in the alternative, for a reversal of the Order of Dismissal
to the extent the same dismisses Appellant's Complaint with
prejudice so that Appellant may refile Appellant's cause of
action pursuant to the provisions of Section 78-12-40 Utah Code
Annotated (1953, as amended).
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
The origin of this case occurred in November of 1971
when Plaintiff cut herself by falling through a storm glass
door at her home.

Defendant, a general surgeon in Ogden, was

sunnnoned to the emergency room and treated her there by examination, removal of glass fragments and suturing (R-12).

He had

never previously seen her as a patient and saw her on four
occasions at the office until January 28th of 1972.

He never

heard from her again until January of 1977 when he received a
telephone call complaining that there were still glass fragments
in the area of her ribs and that they were to be removed surgically (R-12).
Notice of intention to connnence the action was served
upon Defendant October 3, 1977 and this suit was filed December 20,
1978 (R-1, R-13).
Depositions of both Plaintiff and Defendant were taken
March 30, 1979, and jury trial was then set for November 15,
1979.

Upon stipulation of counsel, the trial was continued

from November 15, 1979 (R-29) to January 22, 1980.

The case

was set for jury trial (R-28) and the jury was waived by the
Defendant only the day before trial, after being advised that
Plaintiff would not be present.
The day before trial, January 21, 1980, Plaintiff's
counsel called defense counsel regarding a continuance and
then both counsel spoke by conference call with Judge Wahlquist.
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At that time, Plaintiff's counsel advised the Court of the
reasons for the request of the continuance and defense counsel
advised the Court of opposition to it.

The Court denied the

request and stated trial would start the next morning.
On the day set for trial, Plaintiff's counsel appeared

without his client and defense counsel appeared with his client.
The motion for continuance was renewed, argued and denied, and
the order of dismissal with prejudice entered (R-33).
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXERCISED
ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR A CONTINUANCE.
The rules governing granting or denial of continuance
are basically 40(b) Utah R. Civ. P. and Rule 4.3(a) of the
District Court Rules of Procedure.

For convenience, these are

set out in full as follows:
"(b) Postponement of the Trial. Upon motion of
a party, the court may in its discretion, and
upon. such terms as may be just, including the
payment of costs occasioned by such postponement,
postpone a trial or proceeding upon good cause
shown. If the motion is made upon the ground
of tfie· absence of evidence, such motion shall
also set forth the materiality of the evidence
expected to be obtained and shall show that due
diligence has been used to procure it. The court
may also require the party seeking the continuance
to state, upon affidavit or under oath the evidence
he expects to obtain, and if the adverse party
thereupon admits that such evidence would be
given, and that it may be considered as actually
given on the trial, or offered and excluded as
improper, the trial shall not be postponed upon
that ground." (Emphasis added).
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"Rule 4.3 Continuances-Civil-(a) Cases set for
tr,ial shall not be continued upon stipulation of
counsel alone, but continuances may be allowed by
order of the Presiding Judge or the Judge to whom
the case is assigned for trial. No continuances
shall -be allowed except for good cause shown.
Said continuances may be granted upon motion of
counsel made in open court or by written stipulation of the parties and approval of the court.
A notice of all written motions must be served
upon counsel for the opposing side in the manner
prescribed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
and these rules. In the event that counsel seeks
to have the hearing of the same in less than five
(5) days from the time of the service of the
motion, an order permitting the same and directing
that the notice be served, must be entered by
the cou1='t and s~rved upon counsel with the motion."
(Emphasis added,.
Fundamental in the rules is that good cause must be
shown and that the matter is in the discretion of the trial
court.
There is no hard and fast standard by which this is
measured and the trial court must indeed be granted considerable
latitude in making its determination.

17 Am.Jur2d Continuance

§3 Page 120 states the rule as follows:
"But in the absence of such a statutory provision
or such a statutory construction, the rule is
universally recognized that the granting or
refusal of a continuance rests in the discretion
of the court to which the application is made,
and its ruling thereon, in the absence of an
abuse of discretion, will be upheld on review."
The absence of a party may under certain circtunstances
be grounds for granting of a continuance.

However, a clear

showing of ·good faith and diligence is required therefor, and
a party seeking such a delay cannot subordinate the business
of the court to his own interests or convenience.

-4-

See 17 Am.Jur.2d
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Continuance §17.
Three Utah cases deal with continuance.
Johnson, 373 P.2d 375, 13 Utah2d 269 is the first.

Bairas v.
In that

case, a continuance was requested based upon the affidavit
(unchallenged) of Plaintiff's attending physician in California.
The affidavit stated the Plaintiff's physical condition was not
such that he could travel to attend the trial and that he would
in fact be undergoing serious surgey during the week the trial
was scheduled.

Clearly in Bairas, Plaintiff was unarguably

unable to attend and this was due to matters outside his control.
There is a clear distinctipn between Bairas and the present
case.
Maxfield v. Fishler, 538 P.2d 1323 (1975) involved
a motion for a continuance on the morning of trial.

The court,

in its discretion, denied the motion and dismissed the case
with prejudice.

No abuse of discretion was found in the matter

in that no justification for the continuance was shown as
required by Rule 40(b).
First Security Bank v. Johnson, Utah 1975, 540 P.2d
521 also affirmed a denial of a continuance.

The motion

apparently was predicated on two bases.

job,

(1)

The trial date would jeopardize Plaintiff's

(2)

Plaintiff was in other conflicting federal

a~d,

litigation.
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The denial of the continuance was unanimously confirmed by this court.
Applying the basic law to our case, we find that
jury trial was noticed in November of 1979 for hearing on
January 22, 1980.

The day before trial, Plaintiff's counsel

requested a stipulation for a continuance which was denied by
by defense counsel.

That same day a telephone conference call

with the judge took place in which counsel stated the grounds
of the request for a continuance and the court denied the telephone motion.
Upon being advised that Plaintiff would not in fact
be there, Defendant then waived the jury and the case came on
for a non-jury trial the morning of January 22, 1980 in Ogden
before the Honorable John F. Wahlquist.
At that time, Plaintiff's counsel renewed the motion
for a continuance.
Ralph Foley (R-37).

Defendant was present with his client, Dr.
The position advanced is reflected in the

record at R-38, Lines 4 through 13:
"MR. FRANK: That's correct, your Honor. It's
her opinion that she has to remain in Las Vegas
to appear as a witness before this administrative
agency in their investigation of her friend.
That is the sole basis she's given me for her
nonappearance today.
THE COURT: You don't even know what day she is
going to be a witness or anything of this sort?
MR. FRANK: I think it's sometime during this week,
your Honor, but other than that, I'm not in a
position to represent a specific date to the Court."

-6-
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D'

This motion for continuance was then denied by the
court and an order thereupon entered the same day dismissing
Plaintiff's complaint with prejudice (R-32).
At most, Plaintiff's showing is that for her own
reasons and purposes, she

deci~ed

to put the importance of an

administrative hearing in Nevada ahead of the scheduled trial
of her own lawsuit in District Court in Utah.

There is no

showing or even representation that she was required to attend
such hearing, but just that she wanted to in order to help her
friend.
We have serious doubts that even a showing of being
subpoenaed in another forum through an administrative agency
action would take precedent over the District Court of Weber
County, a court of general jurisdiction which had scheduled
two days well in advance for the trial of this lawsuit.
Clearly it was not an abuse of discretion for Judge
Wahlquist to deny the request on the limited showing made by
Plaintiff.

The court had scheduled its facilities for two

days, surmnoned (and then dismissed) a jury, Defendant had
scheduled two days out of his practice for the trial of this
lawsuit, and Defendant's counsel had likewise scheduled two
days for the exclusive purpose of trying the lawsuit.
To allow the court's schedule to be disrupted just
by Plaintiff's intentional decision to support a friend in an
unnamed proceeding of some type would be unconscionable.

-7-
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Certainly an administrative hearing of some type could change
the order of witnesses appearing to accommodate Plaintiff's
being in Utah two days during the week the hearing was to be
made.

Apparently no effort was made to accomplish this and the

only effort made was placed upon Plaintiff's counsel who was
put in the position of having to seek a continuance without
any real justification for it.
POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXERCISED ITS
DISCRETION IN GRANTING A DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE.
Plaintiff concedes that it is within the discretion
of the court in a situation like this to enter such a dismissal
with prejudice.

See Appellant's brief, Page

_8~-·

Here the

case was regularly called for trial after denial of the motion
for continuance, Plaintiff had no evidence whatsoever to present,
and·accordingly, the decision should have been and was on the
merits.
It would have done Defendant little good if the
dismissal had been without prejudice and Plaintiff had been
allowed under the tolling section of the limitations statute
to refile her case within one year after the dismissal.

That

would just mean that instead of having his trial in January
of 1980, he might be faced with a trial in 1981 or 82 arising
out of the same circumstances.
If such were the case, in order to get the matter
finally resolved, Defendant probably would be better off if

-8-
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the continuance had been granted and trial set for the following
month.
Clearly it was in the interest of justice when
Plaintiff did not proceed with trial at the appointed time
and presented no evidence

or

witnesse~

for Defendant to be

granted relief in the form of a final judgment of dismissal
with prejudice.
CONCLUSION
The order and actions of the trial court, both in
denying the continuance and in entering a dismissal with
prejudice are clearly supported by the record.
courts must have control of their own calendars.

The trial
There was

no good cause shown in this case and indeed a total lack of
any real cause for the nonappearance of the Plaintiff at the
appointed time of trial.

Since she chose voluntarily not to

appear, Defendant was entitled to his day in court and to the
action the trial court took.

The decision should be affirmed

in all respects.

DATED this

.,!.?- day of July,

1980.

Respectfully Submitted,

R~~tlt3vu~

Attorney for Defendant-Respondent
2650 Washington Boulevard
Suite 101
Ogden, Utah 84401
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